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Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Dispute Settlement Under the
United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement: Is the Process
Constitutional?
Introduction
The most comprehensive bilateral trade agreement ever negotiated took
effect in January of 1989. The United States-Canada Free Trade Agree-
ment' provides for the eventual elimination of all tariffs on goods traded
between the two nations, and thus creates the world's largest free trade
area.2 While the Agreement does not affect either country's ability to
impose special duties (tariffs) under their unfair trade laws, it does
establish a special process for the review of decisions to impose these
duties.3 The validity of this process may be vulnerable to attack under
the United States Constitution.
The unfair trade laws of the United States and Canada seek to
reduce the disruptive effect that transnational trade can have on domes-
tic economies. The laws authorize special duties to deter alleged unfair
trade practices. For example, "dumping" occurs when a producer of
goods sells in another country at a price below fair market value, thus
undercutting and injuring domestic industry. To deter dumping, the
unfair trade laws authorize the collection of "antidumping duties."
1. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, United States-Canada, - U.S.T. -, -
T.I.A.S. -, reprinted in 27 LL.M. 281 (1988) [hereinafter Free Trade Agreement or
Agreement].
2. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text for further discussion of tariff
elimination. "A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more
customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce
... are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in
products originating in such territories." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (5),(6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55, U.N.T.S. 194
Art. XXIV, Sec. 8(b).
3. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1904. The dispute resolution
scheme for unfair trade disputes is set forth in chapter 19 of the agreement and
should be distinguished from the dispute resolution scheme established in chapter 18
to deal with more general disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the
Agreement. This Note addresses only the chapter 19 panels.
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Likewise, foreign government subsidies create an unfair competitive
advantage to the detriment of domestic industry. Unfair trade laws
authorize the collection of "countervailing duties" to offset the advan-
tage caused by these subsidies.
4
The Free Trade Agreement and its enabling legislation 5 replaces
judicial review of both countries' antidumping and countervailing duties
with a process resembling arbitration. Binding decisions are rendered
by ad hoc five-person panels comprised of Americans and Canadians
selected from rosters of qualified candidates.6 The process will continue
until 1994 while the two countries attempt to harmonize their antidump-
ing and countervailing duty laws. 7 Legal scholars have testified before
Congress that the withdrawal of the jurisdiction of American courts to
review antidumping and countervailing duties in favor of binational
panel review raises constitutional questions regarding the Appointments
Clause, Article III, and the Due Process Clause.8
This Note argues that although such challenges are not without
merit, the United States Supreme Court is unlikely to find the binational
panel review process unconstitutional. An analysis of important
Supreme Court precedent will demonstrate that the panel review does
not violate the doctrine of separation of powers, nor does it unconstitu-
tionally deny parties due process of law.
I. Background
The United States and Canada enjoy the world's largest bilateral
trade relationship, 9 with Canada receiving about 25% of all United
4. In the U.S., persons may challenge the exaction or non-exaction of these
duties by U.S. government agencies in court.
5. In order to take effect, the U.S. Congress and Canadian Parliament needed to
pass legislation implementing the Agreement and altering preexisting trade laws
where necessary. The U.S. legislation, U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement Imple-
mentation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988), [hereinafter
Implementation Act] amends three U.S. trade laws.
6. See infra notes 63-88 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the
panel process.
7. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1906. The process will extend for
two more years if after the initial five years the countries have not agreed to and
implemented a substitute system of rules. Id.
8. See United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 67 (1988) [hereinafter HouseJudiciary Hearings]. See also Chris-
tenson and Gambrel, Constitutionality of Binational Panel Review in Canada-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement, 23 INT'L LAw 401 (1989); Note, The Binational Panel Mechanism for
Reviewing United States-Canadian Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations: A
Constitutional Diemma?, 29 VA.J. INT'L L. 681 (1989).
9. Trade between the two countries amounted to $166 billion in 1987. State-
ment of Reasons as to How the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
Serves the Interests of U.S. Commerce, reprinted in UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT, COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 216, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 3 [hereinafter COMMUNICATION FROM THE
PRESIDENT]. The U.S. sells as much merchandise to Canada as it does to the twelve
nations of the European Community combined. Id.
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States exports,' 0 and the United States receiving almost 80% of all
Canadian exports." The trade relationship between the two countries
has a long history, and the Free Trade Agreement does not represent
the first attempt at breaking down trade barriers.' 2
The United States-Canada trade relationship has endured varying
levels of protectionist sentiment and varying tariff rates.' 3 A relatively
permanent emphasis on freer trade began with 1935 tariff reductions,
and became entrenched when both Canada and the United States played
key roles in the formation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("the GATT") 14 in 1947.15 Fifty years of trade liberalization pol-
icy and decreasing tariff rates have resulted in a strong and successful
trade relationship between the two countries. 16
In recent years the tariff barriers to trade between Canada and the
United States have been relatively weak. Immediately prior to the Free
Trade Agreement, seventy percent of Canadian goods entered the
United States duty free, and seventy percent of United States goods
entered Canada duty free.' 7 The average Canadian tariff rate on United
States goods was 9.9 percent, while the average United States tariff rate
on imports from Canada was 3.3 percent.' 8 These tariff barriers would
not have been a sufficient impetus for the negotiation of the United
States-Canada Free Trade agreement. Trade in goods, however,
10. Rugman, A Canadian Perspective on U.S. Administered Protection and the Free Trade
Agreement, 40 ME. L. REv. 305 (1988).
11. Id.
12. The effort can be traced to the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 which, among
other things, provided for free trade in primary (as opposed to finished) products
until the U.S. abrogated the agreement in 1866. Other attempts at free trade were
made in 1911 and 1948. Rugman, supra note 10, at 306-07. See alsoJ. WHALLEY, C.
HAMILTON & R. HILL, CANADAN TRADE POLICIES AND THE WORLD ECONOMY (1985);
and Granatstein, Free Trade Between Canada and the United States: The Issue That Will Not
Go Away, in THE POLrrICS OF CANADA'S ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP wrrH THE UNITED
STATES 13-14 (D. Stairs & G. Winham eds. 1985).
13. J. Whalley, C. Hamilton & R. Hill, supra note 12; Rugman, supra note 10, at
307.
14. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. (5),(6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. For the current version binding on
the U.S., see 4 BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1 et seq. (1969). From
the initial twenty-three nations, the number of GATT signatories has increased to
ninety-four. Twenty-two other countries have stated that they are guided by the
GATT in the conduct of their international trade policy. Working groups are study-
ing membership for China and Bulgaria. The Soviet Union has expressed an interest
in becoming a signatory and has been granted observer status.
15. Since 1947, the rounds of multinational trade negotiations held under the
auspices of the GATT have been the primary forum for both the U.S. and Canada in
their efforts to reduce trade restrictions. One notable exception was the 1965 bilat-
eral negotiation of an agreement for managed trade in the automobile industry. See
Wonnacottt, The Auto Pact: Plus or Minus, in FREE TRADE: THE REAL STORY 54-65 (J.
Crispo ed. 1988).
16. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
17. Legault, The Free Trade Negotiations: Canadian and U.S. Perspectives, 12 CANADA-
U.S. LJ. 7 (1987).
18. COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 9, at 2.
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encompasses only a part of the commercial relationship between the
United States and Canada. More complex parts of the relationship,
including investment, trade in services, financial institutions, and non-
tariff barriers such as preferential policies in government procurement
practices, presented more compelling arguments for a comprehensive
agreement. Rising competition from newly-developed nations and from
the European Community19 and the apparent protectionist mood of the
United States Congress 20 were further incentives. In addition, Canadi-
ans felt that protectionism was dictating the administration of United
States unfair trade law.2 1 This section looks at the international frame-
19. Special Report on U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 2 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 35, at 1093 (Aug. 28, 1985).
20. Id. See also Legault, supra note 17, at 9-10.
21. With almost eighty percent of its exports coming to the U.S., Canada has an
enormous stake in the administration of U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty
laws. Between 1980 and 1986, U.S. antidumping, countervailing duty and escape
clause actions have affected about $6.5 billion worth of Canadian products. Legault,
supra note 17, at 9-10. In recent years, U.S. companies have more aggressively insti-
gated investigations of foreign competitors with an increasing proportion of the
investigations resulting in positive preliminary determinations of "material injury" to
U.S. companies. Rugman, supra note 10, at 312-13. The Free Trade Agreement
negotiations took place during a period of rising Canadian dissatisfaction over
antidumping and countervailing duties. See id at 318-21; Legault, supra note 17, at
10. Many Canadians felt that antidumping and countervailing duties were imposed
for political reasons and to "harass" Canadian exporters; see General Developments:
Canada, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 519 (Apr. 16, 1986) (comments of Mur-
ray Smith, economist with the C. D. Howe Institute, before an April 4, 1986, free
trade conference at the University of Western Ontario); HouseJudiciary Hearings, supra
note 8, at 66 (Testimony of Jean Anderson, Chief Counsel, International Trade
Administration, Dept. of Commerce); the Canadians resented the time and expense
of the available procedures for fighting adverse determinations. Professor John
Quinn of Osgoode Hall Law School noted the extreme expense of legal battles over
antidumping and countervailing duty actions. He cited the $4 million in litigation
costs for the 1985 softwood lumber case, and asked, "How many of these cases can
we afford to win?" General Developments: Canada, 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
47, at 1506 (Nov. 27, 1985). Canadian negotiator Alan Nymark stated: "We do not
consider the current U.S. trade laws to be fair. Many U.S. companies systematically
exploit the laws to protect themselves from Canadian competition . . . ." 3 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 666 (May 14, 1986). Former premier of British Colum-
bia William Bennett described the pre-Agreement system of remedies as "a loaded
gun in the hands of any special interest group." l No. 49, at 1496 (Dec. 10, 1986).
A particular sore point was a 1986 preliminary determination by the ITA reversing an
earlier ruling and imposing a fifteen percent countervailing duty on Canadian soft-
wood lumber. 51 Fed. Reg. 37, 453 (1986). Ontario Premier David Peterson cited
the Commerce Department's imposition of the countervailing duty on Canadian soft-
wood lumber as an example of a politically motivated and "Blatantly unjustified"
decision. 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1370 (Nov. 12, 1986). See also McLach-
Ian, et. al., The Canadian - U.S. Free Trade Agreement: A Canadian Perspective,
22(4) J. World Trade 9, 14 (Aug. 1988); 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 375
(Mar. 18, 1987).
Relief from the protectionist application of U.S. unfair trade law became a very
important goal for Canadians. Legault, supra note 17, at 10. Ontario Premier David
Peterson lashed out at U.S. "neo-protectionism" in a speech before the Americas
Society on Nov. 6, 1986, stating that a free trade agreement that does not protect
Canada from countervailing duty harassment would not have much value. General
Developments: Canada, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1370 (Nov. 12, 1986).
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work that has regulated international trade for the past forty years, and
United States law that seeks to protect against some of the harsh eco-
nomic consequences of freer international trade.
A. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (The GATr)
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("the GATT") sets forth a
common code of conduct for international trade. It provides a structure
for the reduction of tariffs22 and a non-binding mechanism for the set-
tlement of disputes which relies on consultation, conciliation, and the
threat of reciprocity.23 The GATT also contemplates multinational
trade negotiations "from time to time," 24 and several "rounds" of mul-
tilateral negotiations have taken place since the creation of the GATT,
usually taking several years each. The most recent of these, the Uruguay
Round, began in 1986.
Although, generally multinational in nature, GATT rules allow sig-
natory nations to form bilateral agreements creating free trade areas if
those agreements meet several requirements: the agreements must
cover substantially all trade between the two countries; the parties must
fully implement the agreement within a reasonable time; agreements
must contain reasonably explicit rules of origin;25 and external tariffs of
the free trade area cannot rise.
26
B. Unfair trade laws
The GAIT authorizes special tariffs to counteract certain foreign trade
Although GAIT would appear to be the appropriate vehicle for remedial action by
Canadians, GATT dispute resolution procedures have proved ineffective. For a gen-
eral discussion of problems with GATT dispute settlement, see Note, Current Efficacy of
the GA77 Dispute Settlement Process, 22 Tzx hrL L. J. 87 (1987). Not only are there
built-in opportunities for delay, see a at 101, but the contracting parties are not
legally obligated to comply with official recommendations or rulings. Id at 95-98.
The Canadians therefore sought some independently operated mechanism not
linked to U.S. government agencies that would both eliminate uncertainty and pro-
vide for systematical fair and rapid conflict or solution. 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
11, at 369 (Mar. 18, 1987). See also 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 346 (Mar. 12,
1986) (comments of Canadian Embassy Economic Minister Jacques Roy before the
National Economists Club); Id No. 37, at 1137 (Sept. 17, 1986) (the Sept. 11, 1986,
comments of Donald Macdonald, chairman of the Royal Commission on the Eco-
nomic Union and Development Prospects for Canada before the House Banking Sub-
committee on Economic Stabilization). Chief Canadian negotiator Simon Reisman
stated that some sort of concession on antidumping and countervailing duties was a
prerequisite for an agreement. News Highlights: Canada, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 47, at 1415 (Nov. 26, 1986). See also Rugman, supra note 10, at 311-12.
22. Legault, supra note 17, at 9-10. See also Rugman, supra note 10, at 311-12.
23. Note, Current Efficacy of the GAT Dispute Settlement Process, 22 Tzx. IN'L LJ., at
87 (1987).
24. GATT, supra note 14, art. XXVIII.
25. Where duties on imported items differ depending on what country they come
from, "rules of origin" are required to set a standard for determining which tariff rate
will apply in unclear situations, e.g. a product manufactured in one country but
shipped from another or a product manufactured and shipped from a certain country
but made up of component parts from another country.
26. GATT, supra note 14, art. XXIV, §§ 5, 8.
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practices that are considered "unfair."' 27 Specifically, the GATT autho-
rizes importing countries to impose "antidumping duties" and "coun-
tervailing duties" if they can establish material injury to a domestic
industry.28 Both the United States and Canada have long had laws
authorizing government agencies to impose such duties. 29
Two different agencies administer the antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws of the United States: the International Trade Adminis-
tration (ITA), an arm of the Department of Commerce, and the
International Trade Commission (ITC), an independent government
agency.30 Private domestic firms typically initiate antidumping or coun-
tervailing duty proceedings by filing a petition with the ITA.3 l
After a party files a petition, the ITA investigates and makes a pre-
liminary determination as to whether the imports are being sold at less
than fair value (in a dumping case), or whether there is an unfair subsidy
(in a countervailing duty case).3 2 If such a finding is made, the ITC will
investigate and make a preliminary determination as to whether there
has been material injury or threat of injury to a United States industry."
If, based on this preliminary determination, the ITC finds no injury, it
will immediately terminate the investigation at both agencies.34 An
affirmative preliminary determination by the ITC will require both agen-
cies to make final determinations. If both agencies reach affirmative
final determinations, then any goods imported after the ITA preliminary
27. GATT, supra note 14, art. VI.
28. Id.
29. The basic antidumping provisions of U.S. law are found at 19 U.S.C.S.
§§ 1673-1675, 1677-1677h (1983 & Supp. 1989). The countervailing duty provi-
sions are found at 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1671-1671h, 1675-1677h (1983 & Supp. 1989).
Canadian countervailing duty laws are found in the Canadian Special Import Meas-
ures Act, I Can. Stat. ch. 25 (1984).
According to U.S. unfair trade law, the amount of an antidumping duty will equal
the difference between the price charged in the exporting country and the price in
the importing country. 19 U.S.C.S. § 1673 (1983 & Supp. 1989). The amount of a
countervailing duty will equal the amount of the subsidy or bounty conferred, 19
U.S.C.S. § 1671 (1983 &. Supp. 1989).
For general background on antidumping and countervailing duty law, see 3 J. PAT-
TISON, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUrIES (1984); G. BRYAN, TAXING UNFAIR
INTERNATIONAL TRADE PRAcrICES (1980); Re, Litigation Before the United States Court of
International Trade, 26 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 437, 450-51 (1981).
30. J. Pattison, supra note 29, at §§ 1.03(3), 1.04. For a general discussion of
independent agencies, see The Independence of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215-
99 (1988); The Independent Agency After Bowsher v. Synar -Alive and Kicking, 40 VAND. L.
REv. 903 (1987).
31. 3 J. Pattison, supra note 29, at § 2.03. The Commerce Department may also
initiate such an action. Id. at § 2.02.
Only "interested parties" may file petitions; interested parties are U.S. entities who
fall into one of three general categories: 1) a manufacturer, producer or wholesaler
of the subject merchandise; 2) a union or group of workers which is representative of
an industry involved in the subject merchandise industry; 3) a trade association
whose members sell the subject merchandise. Id. at § 2.04.
32. Id. at § 1.03(3).
33. Id.
34. Id. at § 3.08.
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determination will be subject to antidumping or countervailing duties.
The Department of Commerce issues a dumping order and instructs
Customs to collect duties in the amount of the difference between the
fair value and the United States price (in a dumping case) or the amount
necessary to offset the subsidy (in a countervailing duty case).
3 5
Judicial review of antidumping and countervailing duty determina-
tions36 lies in the Court of International Trade (Cm, which Congress
created in 198037 as a successor to the Customs Court.3 8 The nine
judges of the CIT are appointed by the President3 9 and have life tenure
during good behavior.40 The court has all the powers of a district court
for preserving order and compelling the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence. 4 1 The CIT has exclusive jurisdiction over suits
against the United States, its agencies, or its officers arising from any law
pertaining to revenue from tariffs or duties.4 2 This includes authority to
review final agency decisions in antidumping and countervailing duty
proceedings.
43
The 1979 Trade Agreements Act4 4 grants standing in the CIT to
35. Id. at § 11.01. The duties collected go to the U.S. treasury.
36. Pattison notes:
Section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, [codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a (1982)] sets forth a specialized framework of review, establishing
several categories of reviewable determinations. Although determinations
are subject to varying requirements regarding time for appeal, procedure for
filing a complaint for formal review, and other aspects, the framework is an
expansive one, specifically providing for appeal of: (1) Decisions not to initi-
ate an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding, (2) Decisions not to
review agreements to eliminate LTFV [less than fair value] sales, eliminate or
offset subsidies, cease exports, or eliminate injurious effect; (3) Decisions not
to review a determination on the basis of changed circumstances; (4) Nega-
tive preliminary injury determinations by the International Trade Commis-
sion; (5) Determinations by the Department of Commerce that a case is
"extraordinarily complicated;" (6) Negative preliminary LTFV sales determi-
nations by the Department; (7) Negative subsidy determinations by the
Department; (8) Final injury determinations by the Commission; (9) Final
LTFV sales determinations by the Department; (10) Final subsidy determina-
tions by the Department; (11) Determinations under administrative review of
antidumping or countervailing duty orders; (12) Determinations by the
Department to suspend an antidumping or countervailing duty investigation;
and (13) Injury determinations by the Commission during a review of a sus-
pended investigation.
Id. at § 12.05(1).
37. Act of Oct. 10, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, Title V, § 501(2), 94 Stat. 1742
(codified at 28 U.S.C § 251 (1982)).
38. Congress established the Customs Court in 1956 pursuant to article III of the
Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1982). See infra sec. II.B for discussion of art. III.
For a brief summary of the evolution of the Court of International Trade, see A.
Vance, The New Ball Park, Eighth Annual Judicial Conference, 92 F.R.D.2d 314, 316-
18 (1981).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1982).
40. Id. at § 252.
41. Id. at § 1581.
42. Id at §§ 1581-82.
43. Id. at § 1582(b)(1).
44. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 79 Stat. 144 (codified in scattered sections in 19 U.S.C.).
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any interested party who was a party to the administrative proceeding.4 5
"Interested party" is defined to include foreign manufacturers, United
States manufacturers, foreign governments, unions, trade associations,
United States importers, and foreign exporters. 4 6 CIT review is nor-
mally based on the record developed by the ITA and the ITC.4 7 The
CIT standards of review are familiar to administrative law: arbitrary and
capricious, abuse of discretion,48 and substantial evidence. 49 When the
CIT rules against the ITA or the ITC, the court remands the case to the
appropriate agency for a decision consistent with the court's disposi-
tion.5 0 CIT decisions are appealable first to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, and ultimately, to the United States Supreme Court.
IL The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Binational Panel
Review in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases
The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement is comprehensive. It
will eliminate all tariffs on goods traded bilaterally within a decade. 5 1 It
immediately eliminated tariffs on goods in competitive industries5 2 and
tariffs on goods in other industries will be phased out over a five or a
ten-year schedule. 53 The Agreement also provides for the liberalization
or harmonization of laws and regulations relating to technical stan-
dards,54 agriculture, 55 wine and distilled spirits,5 6 energy,57 automotive
45. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(d) (1982).
46. Id at § 1677(9). J. Pattison, supra note 29, at § 12.04.
47. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(2) (1982).
48. Id at § 1516a(b)(1)(A).
49. Id. at § 1516a(b)(1)(B).
50. Id at § 1516a(c)(3) (1982). As noted by Jean Anderson, General Counsel to
the ITA, if the court remands a case,
it doesn't tell Commerce or the ITC what the new determination should be
or what method we should use to reach a new determination. If, for example,
Commerce were to find in a countervailing duty case a 10 percent subsidy,
the Court would not decide that the rate should have been 5 percent or 15
percent, or that there was no subsidy at all. Instead, the Court might rule
that we should have taken certain information into account differently or that
we misinterpreted the law in making a particular accounting decision.
House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 65-66.
51. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, art. 401.
52. Id. art. 401(2) & annex 401.2. Products in this category include automatic
data processing equipment, telecommunications equipment, motorcycles, whiskey
and rum, leather, and furs. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SUMMARY OF
THE U.S.-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 12 (1988) [hereinafter SUMMARY].
53. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, art. 401(2) & annex 401.2. Tariffs in
import sensitive industries including plastics, rubber, most wood products, lead, zinc,
base metal articles, footwear, textiles and apparel, steel, many alcoholic beverages,
consumer appliances, precision instruments, watches, and most agricultural and fish
products will be phased out under the ten-year schedule. Tariffs on other products
including paper, furniture, printed matter, chemicals, after-market automotive parts,
precious jewelry, most machines, some musical instruments, and petroleum will be
phased out over five years. SUMMARY, supra note 52, at 12-13.
54. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, at ch. 6.
55. Id. at ch. 7.
56. Id. at ch. 8.
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products,5 8 government procurement,5 9 services,60 investment,61 and
financial services.
6 2
Chapter Nineteen of the Free Trade Agreement sets forth the bina-
tional dispute settlement provisions for antidumping and countervailing
duty cases.6 3 According to the scheme, the United States and Canada
continue to apply their own antidumping and countervailing duty laws
to goods imported from the other country.r 4
Article 1904, the heart of Chapter Nineteen, required both the
United States and Canada to amend laws, thereby replacing judicial
review of final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations with
binational panel review if requested by one of the parties.6 5 If neither
party requests panel review, ordinary judicial review is available. 66 The
Agreement's implementing legislation in the United States preserves
judicial review for constitutional challenges to the process.
67
Although technically only the United States and Canadian govern-
ments, the signatories, may invoke the panel review process, the govern-
ments agreed to invoke the process automatically at the request of
anyone who would otherwise have standing to challenge the determina-
tion in court.
68
A. Panel Membership and Composition
The panels consist of five panelists picked from a roster of fifty qualified
candidates, 6 9 twenty-five selected by each side.70 The United States
Trade Representative draws up the roster of American candidates 71 and
57. Id. at ch. 9.
58. Id. at ch. 10.
59. Id. at ch. 13.
60. Id. at ch. 14.
61. Id. at ch. 16.
62. I at ch. 17.
63. Chapter eighteen of the Agreement establishes a procedure to resolve most
other disputes arising under the Agreement. See supra note 3.
64. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1902. While each government
retains the right to amend its antidumping and countervailing duty laws, the Agree-
ment provides a process to deal with amendments not conforming to GATT or to the
provisions of the Agreement: the other party may refer an amendment to a panel for
a declaratory ruling as to whether the amendment conforms with GATT and the pro-
visions of the Agreement. If the panel finds that the amendment does not conform to
GATT or the provisions of the Agreement they can recommend modifications and
the parties must begin consultations to work out the problems. Id. at art. 1903(1).
65. Id. at art. 1904(1)-(2), (15).
66. Id. at art. 1904(12)(a).
67. Implementation Act, supra note 5, § 401(c)(4)(B).
68. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1904(5).
69. Id. art. 1904 and annex 1901.2. "Candidates shall be of good character, high
standing and repute, and shall be chosen strictly on the basis of objectivity, reliability,
sound judgment, and general famiiarity with international trade law. Candidates
shall not be affiliated with either [the U.S. or Canadian governments]." Id. at (1). "A
majority of the panelists on each panel shall be lawyers in good standing." Id. at (2).
70. Id. at annex 1901.2.
71. Implementation Act, supra note 5, § 405(a)(2)(A).
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a board chaired by the Canadian Minister for International Trade selects
the Canadian candidates. 7 2 In the United States, the candidate list is
submitted to the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means commit-
tees for approval.
78
When a panel is requested, each side selects two panelists74 and if
the Parties or the four appointed panelists are unable to agree on a fifth
panelist, the fifth is selected by lot from the roster.7 5 The candidates can
not be affiliated with either government, and a majority of panel mem-
bers must be lawyers. 7 6 The Agreement establishes a Secretariat with
offices in Washington and Ottawa to facilitate the panel's work and to
service all panel meetings.
7 7
B. Scope and Standard of Review
In a panel proceeding, the panels look to the antidumping or counter-
vailing duty law of the importing country and determine whether the
agency correctly applied the law in reaching its determination. 78 In
determining the content of the antidumping and countervailing law, the
panels consider materials such as legislative history, regulations, admin-
istrative practice, and judicial precedent to the extent that a court of the
importing party would rely on them. The panel bases its review upon
the administrative record of the agencies that make the determination. 7 9
The standard of review is set forth in sections 516A(b)(1)(B) and
516A(b)(1)(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930 as amended.8 0 Thus, when a
panel reviews an antidumping or countervailing duty imposed by United
States agencies, the scope and standard of review of the panels strongly
resembles those of the CIT.
C. Panel Procedures
To institute panel review, a party simply makes a written request to the
other party within thirty days after publication of a final determination
from the ITA or ITC or from the Canadian Import Tribunal or the Dep-
72. Members of Panels Regulations, 123 Canada Gazette, Jan. 6, 1989, at 134.
P.C. 1988-2937.
73. Implementation Act, supra note 5, § 405(a)(3)(A). The Senate Finance Com-
mittee recommended that panel members be subject to Senate confirmation, while
the House Ways and Means Committee felt that such a move would delay creation of
the panels. Under a compromise, the roster of U.S. citizens from which the panels
would be drawn is subject to review by the two committees. Cong. Q., May 28, 1988,
at 1446 (weekly ed.). See also Cong. Q., May 21, 1988, at 1363 (weekly ed.).
74. American panelists are selected by the U.S. Trade Representative. Id. at
§ 405(a)(6)(A). Canadian panel members are selected by the International Trade
Minister. Canada Gazette, supra note 72.
75. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, annex 1901.2(3).
76. Id. annex 1901.2(2).
77. Id. at art. 1909.
78. Id. at art. 1904(2).
79. Id. at art. 1911. The U.S. agencies are the ITA and ITC. The Canadian agen-
cies are the Canadian Import Tribunal and the Deputy Minister of National Revenue
for Customs and Excise. Id.
80. Id.
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uty Minister of National Revenue for Customs and Excise.8 ' Parties are
given an opportunity to file briefs and oral arguments. 82 The proce-
dures are designed to result in a final decision within 315 days of the
request of a panel.83 A final decision of a panel is binding on the par-
ties, 84 however, only with respect to the particular dispute before the
panel. 85 The decisions have no precedential value with regard to the
courts or other panels.
8 6
Panel decisions may only be challenged in extraordinary circum-
stances, such as when a "[p]arty alleges that: ... i) a member of the
panel was guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or serious conflict of interest
... ii) the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of proce-
dure, or iii) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority orjuris-
diction." 8 7 In such a case, the matter is taken up by a three member
extraordinary challenge committee drawn from a ten-person roster com-
prised of judges or former judges of a United States federal court or a
Canadian court of superior jurisdiction.88
M. Constitutionality of the Binational Dispute Panels
The binational dispute panel process is not a radical departure from
past procedures; it closely parallels traditional judicial review.8 9 Yet by
shifting jurisdiction from the courts to binational dispute panels and by
limiting appellate review, the process significantly modifies the structure
of unfair trade dispute resolution in the United States with regard to
Canadian trade. It also has a definite effect on the "process" afforded
individuals and companies.
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to regu-
late foreign commerce 90 and gives the President the power to make trea-
ties.91 Combined, these constitutional grants of power create a broad
base of authority for entering into international agreements. 92 The Free
Trade Agreement would seem to enjoy a presumption of validity
because the executive branch, by express congressional authority, nego-
tiated it and both the Senate and House of Representatives approved
81. Id. at arts. 1904(4), 1911.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at art. 1904(9).
85. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 67 (Testimony of Jean Anderson,
Chief Counsel, International Trade Administration, Dept. of Commerce).
86. Id.
87. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1904(13).
88. Id. at annex 1904(3).
89. HouseJudiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 87 (Testimony of Rep. Sam M. Gib-
bons (R-Fla.)).
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,
441 U.S. 434, 448-51 (1979).
91. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
92. Cf Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981) (Presidential action
pursuant to congressional authorization given strongest latitude of judicial
interpretation).
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International agreements that establish binational or multinational
arbitration panels to resolve international disputes have a long history in
the United States; the Supreme Court has found these panels constitu-
tional. 94 The Free Trade Agreement's panel system, however, differs
from earlier arbitration panels. Unlike earlier arbitration panels which
provided a mechanism for settling claims against foreign governments,
these panels alter United States citizens' ability to challenge the govern-
ment based on duties that the government exacts. 95 For this reason, the
Court may look at the Free Trade Agreement's panels differently than it
has looked at past international arbitration panels. Despite broad con-
stitutional authority in the international arena, neither Congress, the
President, nor the two combined have a completely free hand in execut-
ing international agreements. Like any domestic law, international
agreements may not violate provisions of the Constitution. 9
6
The panels implicate Appointments Clause issues because some
members of every panel reviewing United States agency decisions will
be Canadians who are chosen by the Canadian government. Article III
questions arise because the panels displace the jurisdiction of article III
United States courts. Finally, the panels raise Due Process issues
because individuals and companies may be deprived ofjudicial review of
decisions relating to tariffs that affect them. Ultimately, if the Supreme
Court addresses these issues, it must decide whether the binational
panels established under the Free Trade Agreement stray too far from
the structure of government contemplated in the Constitution or
deprive persons of their constitutionally protected rights of due process.
A. The Appointments Clause
The Appointments Clause 97 of the Constitution sets forth the procedure
93. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
94. ITC memorandum, House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 301, 384. In
1794, the first treaty ratified under the Constitution established binational commis-
sions to make binding decisions in boundary disputes and with regard to claims of
merchants. The selection process used for those panels nearly 200 years ago
strongly resembles the process for the binational panels of the Free Trade Agree-
ment. Id at 384, 395. More recently, the U.S. and Iran, with help from Algeria,
established a claims tribunal made up partly by Iranian government appointees and
partly by U.S. appointees, empowered to render binding decisions in disputes
between Iran and the U.S. Id at 390-95. Binational panels are an accepted method of
international dispute resolution, and argue for the legitimacy of the Free Trade
Agreement's panels.
95. Letter from Customs and International Trade Bar Association to Hon. Hamil-
ton Fish, U.S. House of Representatives (Dec. 4, 1987), reprinted in House Judiciary
Hearings, supra note 8, at 573.
96. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15 (1957). Reid involved an executive agree-
ment between the U.S. and Great Britain permitting U.S. military courts martial to
exercise excusive jurisdiction over offenses committed in Great Britain by American
servicemen or by their dependents. Reid struck down courts martial jurisdiction over
dependents as unconstitutional.
97. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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for appointing United States government officers. 98 The clause contem-
plates the appointment of principal officers by the President with the
Senate's advice and consent, and for the appointment of inferior officers
either by the President alone, by the courts, or by the heads of depart-
ments. Under the Free Trade Agreement and its implementing legisla-
tion, in the event of a dispute, both the United States Trade
Representative and the Canadian International Trade Minister are
empowered to appoint some members of the dispute panel. Because
the United States Trade Representative is a department head, the selec-
tion of American panel members would meet the requirements for the
appointment of inferior officers as set forth in the Appointments Clause.
The appointment of Canadian panel members, however, would meet
none of the Clause's requirements. 99 Whether the Appointments
Clause reaches members of the binational dispute panels at all is unclear
because the panel members might not be officers of the United States.
Soon after negotiators settled on the panel process in an eleventh-
hour session that narrowly beat a congressionally imposed deadline for
completion of negotiations, the Appointments Clause question sur-
faced.100 In an attempt to obviate an Appointments Clause challenge,
the drafters included a fallback provision in the enabling legislation.
Panel decisions are directly binding on U.S. agencies; 10 1 however, if a
court holds this process unconstitutional, panel decisions will be routed
through the President. 10 2 With directives to U.S. agencies coming from
98. The Appointments Clause provides in part:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
99. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, annex 1901.2(2).
100. See 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1247.
101. Implementation Act, supra note 5, tit. IV, § 401(c) (adding § 516(g)(7)(A) to
the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982)).
102. Id. (adding § 516(g)(7)(B) to the Tariff Act of 1930). The fallback position
was the subject of a great deal of controversy and compromise. Faced with a possible
Appointments Clause defect, the Administration and Congress discussed how the
implementing legislation should treat the binational panels. The U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative's Office, the ITA, and the Justice Department pushed for language that
would filter panel decisions requiring U.S. agency action through the President.
Leaders of the relevant Congressional committees balked at this suggestion, fearing
loss of independence of the ITC, an independent agency. 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 21, at 742 (May 25, 1988). Senate Finance Committee Chairman Lloyd Bentsen
(D-Tex), for one, was concerned that allowing the panel decisions to come through
the president would add a political slant to the panel's decisions. Id. at 733. Senator
Robert Packwood (R-Or) suggested the fallback clause as a compromise. Id. This
compromise was agreed upon when the Senate Finance committee was considering
the legislation. Id. The compromise was dropped later when the Finance committee
met with the House Ways and Means committee. 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at
785 (June 1, 1988). Along with the HouseJudiciary Committee, the Senate Finance
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the President rather than the panel, a challenge under the Appointments
Clause would be averted. The Reagan Administration agreed in
advance not to tamper with panel decisions if the fallback provision
should become operable.103 The Appointments Clause applies only to
officers of the United States. The Agreement's enabling legislation
declares that panelists are not considered employees of the United
States government. 10 4 According to Supreme Court precedent, an
inquiry into the panel members' function and duties is necessary to
determine whether they are officers of the United States.
1. Applicability of Appointments Clause to the Binational Panel
In Buckley v. Valeo, 10 5 a leading case interpreting the Appointments
Clause, the Supreme Court concluded that the term "Officers of the
United States" means "any appointee exercising significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States... ."106 In Buckley, the Court
held that members of the Federal Elections Commission were officers of
the United States and that the method of their appointment (two of the
six members were appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate,
two by the Speaker of the House, and two by the President) violated the
Appointments Clause.'
0 7
Under the Free Trade Agreement, the quasi-judicial panels will
interpret and apply United States antidumping and countervailing duty
laws10 8 and will have power under the Agreement to remand determina-
tions of United States agencies to those agencies for further action. 10 9
committee felt that the panel process was constitutional without the fallback provi-
sion. 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 877 (June 15, 1988). The issue delayed the
enabling legislation from being formally introduced in Congress. Id The issue was
only resolved after Treasury Secretary James Baker, Chief of Staff Howard Baker,
U.S. Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter, and Attorney General Edwin Meese con-
vinced HouseJudiciary Chairman Peter Rodino (D-NJ.) to agree to the fallback com-
promise. 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 972 (July 6, 1988). The House
Judiciary committee noted the extremely unusual nature of the fallback provision and
sought to minimize its value as a precedent. H.R. REP. No. 816, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. pt. 4, at 18 (1988).
The legislation also contains a "fast track" constitutional challenge provision to
hasten any litigation that might arise. Implementation Act, supra note 5, tit. IV,
§ 401(c), (Adding § 516A(g)(4)(H) to the Tariff Act of 1930).
103. The Administration stated that "an Executive Order will provide for the Pres-
ident's acceptance, on behalf of the United States, in whole, of any decision of a
panel or committee under the agreement." United States-Canada Free Trade Agree-
ment, Statement of Administrative Action at 106, reprinted in COMMUNICATION FROM
THE PRESIDENT, supra note 9, at 163, 268.
104. Implementation Act, supra note 5, § 405(b). See Christenson & Gambel, supra
note 8, at 424-25 for the proposition that this declaration eliminates any Appoint-
ments Clause problem for the appointment of panelists while maintaining that there
may be an Appointments Clause problem as to implementation of panel decisions
and control of panelists.
105. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
106. Id. at 125-26.
107. Id. at 129-144.
108. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1902(1).
109. Id. at art. 1904(8).
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At first blush, panel members appear to be "exercising significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States," thus falling within
Buckley's definition of an "officer." The prevailing view among those
who advised Congress on the issue, however, is that although the panels
will often decide controversies in accordance with United States
antidumping and countervailing duty law, they will in actuality be inter-
national bodies exercising their authority pursuant to an international
agreement thus rendering the Clause inapplicable. °10 In an apparent
effort to bolster this view, the drafters of the Agreement provided that,
for purposes of the panel's review, the United States' and Canada's
antidumping and countervailing duty laws "are incorporated into th[e]
Agreement." 1 1'
2. Separation of Powers Concerns
To reach its conclusion in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court analyzed the history
and function of the Appointments Clause, 112 noting that in drafting the
Appointments Clause the Framers intended to maintain the separation
of powers between the branches, 1 13 minimizing the threat of tyranny
that would result if the same body that made the law enforced the
law. 14 The Clause is part of the system of checks and balances that is a
"self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement
of one branch at the expense of the other."' " 5
The Free Trade Agreement does not seriously threaten the separa-
tion of powers concept that underlies the Appointments Clause. The
Court has typically used the separation of powers doctrine to strike
down laws with which Congress has attempted to increase its power at
the expense of the Executive." 6 Such a pattern differs from an attempt
to authorize the delegation of functions outside of government. 17 The
110. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 16, at 78-79, (testimony of Jean
Anderson, ITA General Counsel); at 105, 122-24 (testimony and statement of Profes-
sor Harold Bruff, John S. Reddit Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin); at
164-68 (statement of ABA Section on Int'l Law and Practice); at 238-39 (statement of
the Congressional Research Service); at 444-45 (statement of Professor Andreas
Lowenfeld, Charles L. Denison Professor of Law, New York University); at 654 (state-
ment of Committee on International Trade, the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York).
Cf Seattle Master Builders v. Pacific N.W. Elec. Power & Conservation Planning
Council, 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986) (Appointments Clause does not apply to a
council charged with establishing an energy conservation plan pursuant to legislation
passed by four states and Congress).
111. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1904(2).
112. 424 U.S. I, at 129-32 (1976).
113. 424 U.S. at 129-132 (Discussion of the Founding Fathers' debate over the
issue at the Constitutional Convention).
114. 424 U.S. at 120.
115. 424 U.S. at 122. See also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Commodi-
ties Future Trading Comm'n. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 568 (1986).
116. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
117. HouseJudiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 123 (statement of Professor Harold
Bruff, University of Texas at Austin).
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Free Trade Agreement does not create the dangerous situation in which
Congress is both making and enforcing the law.118 Rather, under the
Agreement, Congress makes antidumping and countervailing duty laws,
the ITC and ITA enforce those laws, and the binational panels review
the decisions of those agencies. The Supreme Court has at times
endorsed a formal view of separation of powers in an attempt to main-
tain sharp lines between the branches. 1 9 Under a formal analysis, the
Court might hold the panel process in violation of separation of powers
simply because it takes power away from the judiciary.1 20 More recent
decisions, however, indicate that the Court is more flexible in its
approach to separation of powers.
The Court recently reexamined the Appointments Clause in Morri-
son v. O/son.121 Morrison involved an allegation that the method of
appointing independent counsels as provided by the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act was unconstitutional. The Ethics in Government Act of
1978122 gives the judiciary the power to appoint independent counsels.
By a 7-1 majority, the Court held that the appointment process for
independent counsels did not violate the Appointments Clause 128 and
that the independent counsel provisions of the Act did not violate the
doctrine of separation of powers.12 4
Chief'Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, found that independ-
ent counsels were "inferior" rather than "principal" officers because
they were subject to removal by a higher executive branch official (the
Attorney General), they performed only certain, limited duties, and their
office was limited in jurisdiction and tenure.1 25 Because the independ-
ent counsels created by the Ethics in Government Act are inferior
officers, their appointment by the courts does not violate the Appoint-
ments Clause language which states that "Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers ... in the Courts of Law." The
Court noted that separation of powers concerns underlying the
Appointments Clause arise only when the provisions for appointment
have the potential to impair the constitutional functions assigned to one
of the branches.' 26 Like Buckley, Morrison endorses a functional, rather
than a formal, approach to separation of powers questions. Under this
functional approach, the Court will not disturb a scheme unless it" 'dis-
rupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches [by] pre-
118. See Note, supra note 8, at 702-703; Christenson & Gambrel, supra note 8, at
426-27.
119. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 714; Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chada,
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
120. The argument that the Agreement violates separation of powers by invalidly
taking power from the judiciary implicates the question of when Congress can dis-
pense with judicial review. See notes 137 to 169 and accompanying text.
121. 108 S.Ct. 2597 (1988).
122. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C.A. § 49 (West Supp. 1989).
123. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2611.
124. Id. at 2616-22.
125. Id. at 2608-09.
126. Id. at 2611.
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vent[ing] the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally
assigned functions .... , "127
Whether the binational panel members are officers of the United
States is debatable. If they are, then, applying the Morrison criterion, the
Court would likely consider the panel members inferior rather than
principal officers. The roster of prospective panelists is controlled by a
higher executive branch official (the United States Trade Representa-
tive).12 8 The panelists perform only certain, limited duties, and their
office is limited in jurisdiction and tenure. While the appointment of the
American panel members passes Appointments Clause muster for infer-
ior officers, the appointment of the Canadian members does not. If the
Court backs itself into this corner, the appointment of Canadian panel
members seems problematic in light of the specific appointment
requirements of the Appointments Clause. The Court, however, has
indicated in recent articulations of the doctrine of separations of powers
that as long as there were negotiations and agreement between the exec-
utive and legislative branches, the Court will be slow to interfere.
The Court recently reinforced the functional approach to separa-
tion of powers with its decision in Mistretta v. United States.1 29 In uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act,' 3 0 which created
an independent commission within the Judicial Branch to promulgate
sentencing guidelines for federal offenses,' 3 ' the Court stated that
"[i]n adopting [a] flexible understanding of separation of powers, we sim-
ply have recognized Madison's teaching that the greatest security against
tyranny - the accumulation of excessive authority in a single branch - lies
not in a hermetic division between the Branches, but in a carefully crafted
system of checked and balanced power within each Branch.
1 3 2
In Mistretta, the Court reaffirmed that it would uphold "statutory provi-
sions that to some degree commingle the functions of the Branches, but
that pose no danger of either aggrandizement or encroachment."'
3 3
Adopting an approach thatJustice White had advocated in previous
dissenting opinions,' 3 4 the Mistretta Court deferred to the bargain struck
by the Executive and Legislative branches in their attempt to deal with
the sentencing problem, stating that "when this Court is asked to invali-
date a statutory provision that has been approved by both Houses of the
Congress and signed by the President, particularly an Act of Congress
127. Id. at 2621 (quoting Nixon v. Adm. of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
128. Implementation Act, supra note 5, § 405(a).
129. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 647 (1989).
130. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1037 (1984).
131. Id. tit. II, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2017 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 991-998 (Supp. V 1987)).
132. Mistretta, 109 S.Ct. at 659.
133. Id. at 660.
134. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 760-777 (1986) (White, J., dissenting);
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 92-118
(1982) (WhiteJ, dissenting); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chada, 462 U.S.
919, 967-1003 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
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that confronts a deeply vexing national problem, it should only do so for
the most compelling constitutional reasons." 13 5 The Court went on to
note that "constitutional principles of separated powers are not violated
... by mere anomaly or innovation." 13 6 As they did with the Sentencing
Commission in Mistretta, the Court will likely uphold the binational dis-
pute resolution panels as an innovation which was the product of exten-
sive negotiations between Congress and the Executive aimed at solving
a vexing national problem.
B. Article III Questions
Artide III of the Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.'
' 37
Also, article III guarantees judges lifetime tenure during good behavior
and security of compensation.13 8 As noted by the Supreme Court, arti-
cle III "serves both to protect 'the role of the independent judiciary
within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government' and to safe-
guard litigants' 'right to have daims decided before judges who are free
from potential domination by other branches of government.' "139 The
Free Trade Agreement's binational panels are not article III tribunals;
panel members are not appointed for life or given security of compensa-
tion. The question arises as to whether this presents a constitutional
problem. °40 The broad language of the Constitution does not specifi-
cally address Congress' power to create non-article III tribunals in which
judges are not guaranteed lifetime tenure nor guaranteed security of
compensation. The Supreme Court has struggled with the issue and its
jurisprudence in the area "has long abounded with confusion."' 141
Article III could be interpreted to mean that any time Congress cre-
ates an adjudicative body, it must be in the nature of an article III court
in order to insure the independence of the adjudicator.142 Historically,
the Supreme Court has not followed this "article III literalism."' 143
Rather, the Court has given Congress broad authority to establish legis-
lative and administrative courts outside of article III.144 The question
135. Mistretta, 109 S.Ct. at 661 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. at 737 (Stevens,
J., concurring)).
136. Mistretta, 109 S.Ct. at 661.
137. U.S. Const., art. III, § 1.
138. Id.
139. Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (quoting
Thomas v. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568, 582-83 (1984) and United States v. Will,
449 U.S. 200 (1980).
140. See Note, The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement and U.S. Constitution:
Does Article If Allow Binational Panel Review of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Deter-
minations?, 13 B.C. ITr'L & CoMP. L.REv. 237 (1990).
141. Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HAnv. L.
Rxv. 916 (1988).
142. Id.
143. Id at 917.
144. Id.
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regarding the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement is whether
the disputes heard by the binational panels are of a type required by the
Constitution to be heard in an article III court.
The tribunal for review of trade cases has not always been sub-
sumed under article III. In 1929, in Ex parte Bakelite Corp.,14 5 the
Supreme Court held that judges of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (the precursor to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit)
did not enjoy article III protections.1 4 6 In 1956, however, Congress
declared the court to be an article III court, 14 7 which the Supreme
Court later recognized in Glidden v. Zdanok. 14 8 In Glidden, the Court
based its decision both on the functions of the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals 14 9 and on deference to Congress's declaration. o5 0 The
Glidden Court avoided the question of whether Congress has the power
to commit "'inherently' judicial business to tribunals other than Article
III courts."1 5 1
Three times, in recent years, the Supreme Court has addressed the
question of when adjudication in an article III court is mandatory;' 5 2
however, the issue is still muddled.15 3 In its most recent decisions, the
Court employed an ad hoc balancing test that, while flexible, makes it
difficult to predict an outcome to a specific case.15 4
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co.,1 5 a
sharply divided Court' 5 6 held that federal bankruptcy judges who lacked
article III status could not hear certain disputes. In drawing the line as
to the limits of non-article III adjudication, the Court spoke of a pro-
tected core of article IIIjudicial powers which include traditional suits at
common law.' 5 7 Another distinction bearing on the legislature's ability
to create non-article III courts is whether the court is adjudicating "pri-
vate rights" or "public rights." According to the plurality, while the
article III courts are mandatory for the adjudication of private law mat-
145. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
146. Id. at 458-59.
147. Act ofJuly 14, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-703, 70 Stat. 532 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 251).
148. Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
149. Id. at 552, 558-61.
150. Id. at 542-43.
151. Id. at 549. The Court assumed for the sake of the decision that the business
of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was not inherently judicial. Id.
152. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S 50
(1982); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
153. Fallon, supra note 141, at 917.
154. Id.
155. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982).
156. Justice Brennan wrote for the plurality, joined by Justices Marshall, Black-
mun, and Stevens. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, wrote a separate
opinion concurring in the result. ChiefJustice Burger wrote a dissenting opinion as
did Justice White, with ChiefJustice Burger and Justice Powell joining.
157. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 69-70.
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ters, they are not required for adjudication of public rights, defined as
claims against the government that Congress could commit entirely to
executive discretion.1 58 Commentators have criticized the Northern Pipe-
line Court's crude "public/private" distinction.
1 5 9
Based on the Northern Pipeline decision, it is unclear whether the
Court would require complaints regarding antidumping and counter-
vailing duties to be heard by an article III court rather than a binational
panel. On the one hand, some have argued that the right to sue the
government for improperly imposed import duties has deep historical
roots, and thus falls within the "protected core" of article III judicial
powers. 160 On the other hand, the Court has characterized suits against
United States agencies such as the ITC or ITA as involving public rights
rather than private rights, 16 1 arguing against a constitutional right to an
article III court.
In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products,'16 2 a case involving a
complicated statute regarding the registration of pesticides by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, the Court upheld a scheme that involved
the resolution of claims by a federal arbitrator against attacks that it vio-
lated article III, concluding that the arbitration did not threaten the
independent role of the judiciary.' 63 The Court minimized, but did not
dismiss, the "public rights"/"private rights" distinction, and noted that
arbitration was a pragmatic solution to the problems that the statute
sought to cure. The Court based its decision in part on the fact that the
statute did not completely preempt article III courts, but provided for
article III adjudication in limited cases. The holding in Union Carbide is
difficult to apply to the Free Trade Agreement not only because of the
differences in fact patterns and adjudicative procedures, but also
because the Court failed to provide a principled test for determining
when an article III court is required.
More recently, in Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor,16 4 the
Court again did not require article III adjudication, but instead allowed
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to hear state common law
counterclaims. The Court applied a three-pronged balancing test that
considered (1) the extent of inroads on the "essential attributes ofjudi-
cial power," (2) the nature of the rights to be adjudicated, and (3) the
concerns that drove Congress to depart from article 111.165 Compared
to Thomas v. Union Carbide, Schor presents a less amorphous test for
determining when article III adjudication is required. However, this test
still creates problems for predicting the outcome of a specific case such
158. 458 U.S. at 67-70.
159. Fallon, supra note 141, at 929.
160. HouseJudidary Hearings, supra note 8, at 526-38 (Statement of Sidney Weiss).
161. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458-59 (1929).
162. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
163. Id. at 589-93.
164. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
165. Id. at 852.
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as the Free Trade Agreement because it is difficult to know the weight
the Court will give the factors included in the balancing scheme.
Although the tradition of article III jurisdiction over tariff cases is
strong throughout our history, arguing against the constitutionality of
the panel process under the first prong of the Schor test,166 if the court
focuses on the second two prongs, the nature of the rights to be adjudi-
cated and the concerns that led to a departure from article III, the Court
will probably find the panel process constitutional. The claims involve
"public rights" rather than "private rights,"16 7 and the panel process as
found in the Free Trade Agreement was necessary to gain Canadian
acceptance of the Agreement, which was otherwise strongly in the
United States' best interest.168 Placing the balance in these terms would
likely lead the Court to validate the binational panels because two of the
interests weigh in favor of validity. This conclusion is bolstered by the
fact that the separation of powers concerns are minimal regarding the
balance of power between the branches.
169
C. Due Process Clause
Related to the question of whether article III requires judicial
review of United States agency decisions, is the question of whether the
Due Process Clause, 170 as a matter of individual rights, requires that a
United States court, rather than a binational panel, review an agency
determination regarding an antidumping or countervailing duty. As
noted above, one purpose of the article III requirements is to safeguard
litigants' right to have claims decided before an independent judici-
ary. 17 1 Depriving parties of this safeguard could conceivably be a viola-
tion of their right to due process of law. The requirements of the Due
Process Clause are not fixed, but must be shaped to fit the particular
166. House Judiciaty Hearings, supra note 8, at 516 (Statement of Sidney N. Weiss).
167. Schor, 478 U.S. at 853-54.
168. In their quest for protection from the misuse of U.S. unfair trade laws the
Canadian negotiators would accept nothing less than the binational dispute panel
process. As Manitoba Premier Howard Pawley stated: "Unless there is a solid trade
dispute mechanise, the whole purpose of discussions is rather meaningless." 4 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 905 (July 15, 1987). See also 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 32, at 1016 (Aug. 12, 1987). 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1121, 1122
(Sept. 16, 1987). Free Trade Agreement negotiations broke down when Canadian
negotiators walked out on Sept. 23, 1987, over the antidumping and countervailing
duty dispute resolution issue. Cong. Q. (weekly ed.) Sept. 26, 1987, at 2353. 4 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 1178 (Sept. 30, 1987). Negotiations were revived only
after meetings between high level Cabinet officials of the two governments. 4 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1179 (Sept. 30, 1987). The Canadians originally
wanted a wholesale exemption from U.S. unfair trade laws. The U.S. negotiators
made it clear that such an exemption had no realistic chance of surviving Congress. 4
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1016 (Aug. 12, 1987). 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 25, at 824, 825 (June 24, 1987). 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1329, 1330
(Oct. 28, 1987). 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1405 (Nov. 19, 1986); 4 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1121, 1122 (Sept. 16, 1987).
169. See supra notes 112-119 and accompanying text.
170. U.S. Const. amend. V.
171. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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circumstances and the particular right at issue. 172 In deciding what pro-
cess is due, courts consider the government interest, the private interest
that is affected, "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards."'
173
Article III courts are not the sole guarantors of due process; the
central issue in a due process analysis is not the forum but the adequacy
of the procedures.' 74 For example, the Supreme Court has upheld the
denial of access to federal courts in disputes involving the federal Medi-
care program.' 75 The Due Process Clause, however, places some limits
on the extent to which adjudication in an article III court can be
restricted, though the case law does not clearly define those limits.' 76
In applying the due process test to a specific regime of adjudication,
the nature of the private interest affected must be examined to deter-
mine if the interest is of a type protected by the Due Process Clause (life,
liberty or property). The binational panels affect private parties' inter-
ests in correct assessments of duties, whether they be domestic produ-
cers seeking higher duties, or domestic importers and foreign exporters
seeking lower duties.' 77 Domestic importers and foreign exporters who
have contracted to buy and sell goods arguably have a stronger property
interest than domestic producers' interests in having higher tariffs
imposed on their foreign competitor.' 78 While the government clearly
has the ability to impose duties on products, 179 "once a regime of
importation has been established .... rights and expectations arise...
that may well merit constitutional protection."' 8 0 A duty on an import is
tantamount to a tax on property, and taxes have always been subject to
substantial constitutional safeguards.' 8 '
In the due process calculation mentioned above, the "risk of erro-
neous deprivation of a claimant's interest" requires an inquiry as to
whether or not the panels will serve as an adequate check on agency
error. The response to this inquiry favors the validity of the panels. In
addition to the process that a party to an antidumping or countervailing
172. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1986).
173. Id. at 334-35.
174. See Note, supra note 8, at 704-05.
175. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 198-200 (1982).
176. Housejudiciaty Hearings, supra note 8, at 477-78 (Letter of Professor David Sha-
piro, Harvard Law School).
177. Id at 114 (Statement of Professor Harold Bruff, University of Texas).
178. House Judiciay Hearings, supra note 8, at 483 (statement of Professor David
Shapiro). See Christenson & Gambrel, supra note 8, at 421-22 (for the argument that
those benefitting from the FTA might be estopped from challenging the jurisdiction
of the panels).
179. See Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 318
(1933).
180. HouseJudiciaty Hearings, supra note 8, at 484 (statement of Professor David
Shapiro). See also id at 110-11 (statement of Professor Harold Bruff citing Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)).
181. Id. at 517-20 (statement of Sidney N. Weiss).
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duty determination is provided by the ITC or ITA, the binational panel
process includes a broad range of procedural protections. The proce-
dures are very similar to those found in the Court of International
Trade. All parties that would have standing to sue in a judicial proceed-
ing have standing under the binational panel process.1 8 2 Litigants have
the right to counsel, may file written briefs, and may argue their case
orally before an impartial tribunal.18 3 The scope of the panel's review is
limited and the standards of review are similar to the courts whose juris-
diction the panels replace.' 8 4 The panels issue written decisions speci-
fying the facts and legal conclusions.' 8 5 Extraordinary challenge
procedures guard against gross misconduct of panel members. 186 On
the other hand, litigants do not have their cause heard by a judge
appointed for life who has salary security. The litigants are put on a fast
schedule and are deprived of review by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court.
The government's interest in the antidumping and countervailing
dispute panels of the Free Trade Agreement flows from the necessity of
including such a process in the Agreement. The Canadians were unwill-
ing to accept the Agreement without the mechanism.' 8 7 Thus, the gov-
ernmental interest in the substitute process is an integral part of the
important interest of promoting better international trade relations.' 8 8
In sum, the government's interest in the binational panel process is
arguably quite strong and the risk that the panels will deprive parties of
their interest in adequate review is low due to the many procedural pro-
tections. For these reasons the court would probably not sustain a due
process challenge to the binational panels of the Free Trade
Agreement.' 8 9
Conclusion
The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement not only elimi-
nates tariffs and other trade barriers between the two countries, but the
Agreement also addresses Canadian concern over the administration of
182. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1904(5).
183. Id. at art. 1904(7).
184. See supra notes 78 to 88 and accompanying text.
185. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, annex 1901.2(5).
186. Id at annex 1904.13.
187. Canada adamantly insisted on securing relief from perceived unfair applica-
tion of U.S. trade laws. See supra note 168.
188. HouseJudiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 115 (Statement of Prof. Harold H.
Bruff, University of Texas Law School).
189. Christenson & Gambrel, supra note 8, analyze three aspects of due process
concerns: (1) the delegation ofjurisdiction to the panels by Congress, (2) the disabil-
ity to challenge the nojudidal review provision, and (3) provisions of the Agreement
that fadally meet the requirements of due process. The authors condude that in
light of the fact that the disputes involve public rights, the Agreement and its imple-
menting legislation provide sufficient standards of review and safeguards against
unfairness, including notice provisions and an extraordinary challenge procedure, to
satisfy the Due Process clause. Id. at 419-22.
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United States antidumping and countervailing duty laws. The negotia-
tors had hoped to develop a substitute system of antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty rules in both countries but the task proved too large for
the limited time frame of the Free Trade Agreement negotiations.
Negotiations will continue toward the goal of harmonized rules. In the
meantime, the Agreement leaves each country's respective process for
determining when to impose such duties intact, while shifting review
jurisdiction from the courts to a binational panel process which the
Agreement establishes.
Binational panels are not new to international dispute resolution;
however, unlike other international dispute resolution panels, this panel
process affects citizens' ability to challenge their own government over
duties imposed. This change may violate provisions of the United States
Constitution. In particular, the panel process may violate the Appoint-
ments Clause, article III, and the Due Process Clause. However, consti-
tutional challenges on these grounds would probably fail, generally
because the panel process does not pose a great threat to the separation
of powers doctrine that underlies the Appointments Clause and article
III, nor do the binational panels radically curtail the process received by
challengers of the antidumping or countervailing duties. Absent signifi-
cant threats to the separation of powers or due process, it is unlikely that
the Court would allow the Constitution to hinder progress in interna-
tional trade.
Peter Huston
Vol 23
